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double vision
Brusse ls  S tud ies  debates
One objective of Brussels Studies is to encourage debate around scholarly articles con-
taining proposals for public action. With this issue, under the heading "double vision”, we 
are inaugurating a new formula – a dialogue between academics from different disci-
plines – in this case two economists and a geographer – on the highly controversial is-
sue of noise pollution caused by air traffic at Brussels National. The former propose 
creating a market for noise emissions as a regulatory instrument, while the latter evokes 
political responsibility to regulate the matter, based on the principle of limiting the num-
ber of people submitted to noise from aircraft.
The Double vision series is a 
compilation of articles for de-
bate which bring together aca-
demics from different disciplines 
to provide converging or diverg-
ing views of the same issue.
Pierre Picard and Thierry Bréchet
Can economic instruments regulate 
noise pollution in locations near airports?1
Translation: Gail Ann Fagen
The issue of noise pollution near the Brussels National airport has turned into a 
highly political topic. Until now decisions on the number and location of flights over 
various municipalities were taken by a federal institution (ministry or government) 
entrusted to federalise the viewpoints of the regional and economic entities involved 
and to manage the economic and social impacts, especially the health of the resi-
dents. In the light of present difficulties, it might be useful to present some economic 
reflections on this subject. These thoughts revolve around the question of efficiently 
managing the external effects of airport activity.
When an airline company inaugurates a connection, it organises a flight that enables 
passengers to travel, but one that also causes disturbing noise in residential areas. 
While the "internal" agents of the airline company derive the profits of this flight 
(revenue minus the costs), the noise pollution must be borne by "external" agents 
outside this company. Indeed, neither the stockholders, directors, workers or travel-
lers are effected by the noise of this flight. In economic terms, noise pollution is 
therefore a "negative externality", for it undermines the well-being of the agents not 
involved in the company's economic activity.
The origin of the problem with an external effect, or externality, caused by an eco-
nomic activity lies in the fact that its economic and social costs and benefits are not 
borne by the same agent. Daily life provides numerous examples of externality. A 
typical example is a dance party planned by your neighbour which will keep you 
awake. In this case the externality arises because the producer of the nuisance is 
not concerned by your well-being (a night's sleep). Economic theory nevertheless 
points to efficient solutions to this type of problem. One consists in granting you a 
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right to silence. In this case you have the right to ask for compensation on the night 
of the dance party, for example the cost of a hotel room. If your neighbour considers  
the cost too high compared to the utility derived from his dance party he will give up 
the idea. Note here that cancelling the dance party is an efficient result from the 
social point of view, since it shows that your neighbour's utility is less than your "dis-
utility". A second solution consists in giving your neighbour the right to make noise. 
You can then pay him to rent a dance hall if you really wish to stay in that night, and 
once again the same argument applies. This is the theory of Ronald Coase, winner 
of the 1991 Nobel Prize for economy: the combination of (i) a transaction between 
agents and (ii) a definition of the property rights on the source of an externality can 
restore economic efficiency.
It is interesting to apply this economic argument to airport development. Two ques-
tions are therefore relevant: is there such a thing as allocation of rights to silence 
between noise emitters and receivers? Is there a possibility for negotiation and 
transaction between these two actors? Several notions can be stressed: 
First, in most airport sites the property rights to noise belong to neither the local 
residents (or residents associations or municipalities) nor to the airline companies (or 
the airport). Therefore socio-economic efficiency is naturally not involved.
Second, a small number of airports either compensate local residents (the Orly air-
port for example), or the airlines pay a noise tax (such as Tokyo Haneda, Amsterdam 
Schipol or Sydney airports). Unfortunately, in this latter case, there is generally no 
explicit link between the costs borne by the local residents and the airlines' profits.2 
Third, an argument frequently misused asserts that the property prices and rental of 
real estate in areas inflicted with airport noise are diminished to compensate the 
owners and/or tenants for nuisance from the aircraft noise. As a matter of fact this 
argument does not influence efficiency and the socio-economic desirability of airport 
activity. The money is actually transferred from owner to owner or between owners 
and tenants; they are not transfers of value between the emitter and the receiver of 
the noise. Under Ronald Coase's analysis, to achieve economic efficiency the drop 
in real estate prices must be completely reflected in the airlines' profits.
Lastly, the same remark applies to the NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) argument 
whereby individuals (unrightfully) refuse to suffer local disadvantages (in their back-
yard) arising from a common good that has an overall benefit (for their local area and 
region). This is the case at hand where we have an airport that causes nuisance for 
residents living in the flight corridors, but at the same time facilitates the journeys of 
national and foreign (transiting) travellers. Here again, under Ronald Coase's analy-
sis, to have socio-economic efficiency the residents' disadvantages, especially the 
resulting lower real estate prices, must be completely reflected in the airlines' profits.
Economic texts unfortunately have relatively little to say about the choice of eco-
nomic instruments and institutions that would allow an efficient management of 
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noise pollution caused by airports. Nonetheless, as early as 1972, William Baxter 
and Lillian Altree3 proposed two solutions. The first consisted in setting up a private 
airport company that would not only handle the airport's economic activity, but 
would also own the adjacent property subject to the noise. This company would 
naturally find a balance between its economic development and the value of its real 
estate holdings. Prospects of higher property value would entice this company to 
arrange for less noisy flights or else sanction flights with the highest "noise/profit" 
ratio. This solution however hardly seems realistic because it would exacerbate the 
problem of airport financing and it would also accentuate the airport's monopoly 
power over the airline companies.
Baxter and Atree's second solution would be to set up an independent, not for 
profit, institution that would be responsible for yearly evaluations of the variations in 
property value in the air corridor zones and for compensating the owners for earn-
ings lost. The advantages of this scheme lie in the absence both of the need to fi-
nance this institution and of monopoly power. There are several drawbacks how-
ever, both methodological and legal. On one hand it is quite hard to distinguish the 
impact of noise pollution on property value among other effects (such as regional 
decline, real estate bubble, etc.). On the other hand it is even harder to reach an 
agreement among the various stakeholders on the compensation to be handed out. 
If, in the first solution above, such a decision could be taken unofficially by the pri-
vate airport company (between its "Development" and "Real Estate" divisions), in 
this second solution it would have to be officialised in the structure proposed by 
William Baxter and Lillian Altree. Obviously several legal appeals could be expected 
from the party summoned to pay. Thus both of these economic proposals appear 
hard to implement.
In view of the political and legal complexity of the issue of noise management and 
Zaventem airport, we felt it would be useful to expand our range of regulatory 
modes. We propose an original solution4 that considers the notion of a market in 
tradable noise permits (or silence permits) to manage the noise pollution generated 
by the aircraft flying into or out of an airport. Such a market would enable airlines, 
responsible for noise emissions, to compensate the local residents who are harmed. 
Thus the local residents are granted a right to silence and the negotiation between 
these residents and the airlines is organised around this market. Participation by the 
municipalities or resident associations located along the air corridors would also 
make it possible to implement the optimal socio-economic number and spatial dis-
tribution of flights among routes. This market could be managed "in complete neu-
trality" by a computer programme, such as those already employed in markets on 
energy or carbon dioxide quotas. Involvement by the political authorities is thus un-
necessary. Organisation of such a market would not entail the drawbacks of the two 
solutions proposed by Baxter and Altree. Indeed, it does not require heavy financing 
or a regular empirical study of the impact of noise on property value; it does not 
increase the airport's monopoly power, nor does it lead to litigation on the damages 
Brussels Studies
the e-journal for academic research on Brussels  3
3 BAXTER William and ALTREE Lillian (1972), “Legal Aspects of Airport Noise”, Journal of Law 
and Economics 15, 1-113.
4  Thierry BRECHET et Pierre PICARD. “The price of silence: tradable noise permits and air-
ports”, CORE discussion paper 2007/43
(http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/Brechet-Picard-COREdp.pdf).
Thierry Bréchet and Pierre Picard, “Can economic instruments regulate noise pollution in locations near airports?”,
comments of Frédéric Dobruszkes, Brussels Studies, issue 12, 2007 december the 3rd, www.brusselsstudies.be
to be paid. Nonetheless, as in any market, proceeds are generated and they are 
distributed to certain groups of residents as well as to the most cost effective flights. 
Furthermore this solution nevertheless meets the conditions of socio-economic effi-
ciency, and this without the intervention of political authorities. 
The idea of granting local residents a right to silence may seem provocative. But 
Ronald Coase's message must be clearly understood. If the airport activity is unable 
to survive after the residents are granted this right and can sell them back to the 
airline companies, this means that the socio-economic costs of air transport exceed 
the benefits. Thus there is a strong presumption that the socio-economic benefits of 
the airport exceed its costs. Indeed, Brian and David Pearce, researchers at the 
University College of London estimated that a very low tax (less than 2%) on air 
fares would suffice to compensate for the whole set of environmental effects (noise 
pollution, air pollution, etc.) caused by activity at Heathrow Airport.5 In the case of 
Brussels National airport, it has been shown that a permanent airport tax of € 12.5 
per passenger would yield revenue equivalent to the rental cost of the whole resi-
dential area under one of the two air corridors used by Brussels National in 1999.6 
In other words, the problem of noise pollution could be completely solved by using 
just a small part of the revenue from airport activities.
A tradable noise permit market would lead to an optimal socio-economic situation. 
An academic discussion on this subject will take place at the "Workshop on Regula-
tion of Airport Noise", held at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) on 10 Decem-
ber 2007.7 
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Frédéric Dobruszkes
A few comments on the text: 
“Can economic instruments regulate 
noise pollution in locations near airports?”
The text presented has the merit of discussing a highly topical question of airport 
nuisance. Although it is thought-provoking, it seems to raise more questions than it 
solves. We shall ignore the fact that the authors make no distinction between day-
time and nighttime flights, or that they only speak of passenger flights while night 
flights, the source of the worst disturbance, are primarily cargo flights. More basi-
cally, the text raises serious questions in so far as on one hand it approaches the 
issue outside the realm of social relations, and on the other it confines itself to the 
issue of noise pollution without dealing with public safety. We shall try to develop 
these two remarks in an accessible and non-polemic manner.
The solution proposed is a scheme directly derived from concepts and methods 
used in a certain form of economics that works in and with a world that is regular, 
isotropic and socially neutral, in other words in a bubble divorced from social reali-
ties, and in the case at hand, geographic realities since the issue of airport nuisance 
by definition is part and parcel of physical and human space. Consequently, the 
solution proposed – a market for noise rights – disregards the social relations that 
make up our society and that form the diversity of the Brussels region. It appears as 
an apolitical solution to a problem that is clearly political, even if technical constraints 
linked to air traffic procedures must be taken into account. At a time when the by-
word is cross-cutting disciplinarity, something seems to be missing here.
So, when we take into account the social and geographical facets of the issue un-
der discussion, what can we observe? During the day, 45% of the flights taking off 
head towards the east of Brussels and its periphery (Evere, Woluwe, Kraainem,...), 
and as many towards the north/northwest of Brussels (Laeken, Grimbergen, 
Wemmel,...). The rest fly over densely populated neighbourhoods in the centre 
(Schaerbeek, Pentagon, Molenbeek,...) – the "Chabert" weekend route and the 
jumbo jet route – and over the neighbourhoods located to the north and east of the 
airport. During the night, planes take off over the east (27%), the north (36%), the 
centre of Brussels via the "Canal", or "Onkelinx", route (14%) and over the neigh-
bourhoods to the north and east of the airport (24%) (see figure below for an ap-
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proximate idea). Procedures leading to flights over Brussels's eastern and northern 
neighbourhoods and peripheries were introduced in 1971 to reduce the number of 
people living in the flight corridors, compared to the former routes that flew over 
Brussels.
This simplified geography of flight paths (thus nuisance) reflects a fairly clear-cut 
social geography: the Eastern neighbourhoods or peripheries, as for a large part the 
North/Northwest, are particularly well-off areas, while in the central neighbourhoods 
the population is much denser and tend to be lower-income or else middle class.
In such a context, what can be said about the solution of a market for rights to 
make noise? For such a market to be fair, the stakeholders would have to be on 
equal footing. But all stakeholders are equal only in simplistic theories. It is hard to 
imagine how rich and poor citizens, or their public representatives, could be on 
equal footing to negotiate compensation or avoidance of nuisance in exchange for 
cold, hard cash. One may expect that the lower-income residents will be tempted to 
accept the nuisance in exchange for additional revenue, either direct (if the money is 
distributed personally) or indirect (if the money is invested in their neighbourhood). 
The possibility becomes even clearer in the light of studies showing that populations  
exposed to noise may well not objectivise the consequences, even as they uncon-
sciously suffer from them (perturbed sleep, lack of concentration,...). Therefore it 
would be hard to claim that citizens were accepting financial compensation in full 
awareness of the facts. On the other hand, the residents of better off neighbour-
hoods a priori have little need for extra money, and would even be able to pay to be 
free of this nuisance. Consequently, implementing a noise permit market in Brussels 
entails the risk of a deconcentration of flight paths to the detriment of the lower-
income and densely populated areas of Brussels.
This leads us to also approach the debate in terms of risk to the residents' safety. 
Indeed, no one would like to see an airplane crash in Brussels or its periphery, but 
this possibility cannot be excluded. Beyond the possibility of an accident due to 
technical or human error, the risk of a terrorist act cannot be ignored. Need we recall 
that Brussels is the headquarters of NATO and the EU, international institutions that 
are not necessarily "appreciated" everywhere in the world. Along these lines, when 
the term "market for noise pollution" is replaced by "market for risk of death", the 
solution of a market in flight paths sounds even less fair, if not completely cynical. 
Can we seriously accept, if only from a moral standpoint, that poor populations 
should be paid to take the risk - clearly infinitesimal, but a risk nevertheless – of per-
ishing after a plane crash in their neighbourhood? And, how to justify the human 
consequences of an accident in a heavily populated area? Might the cynical reply be 
that the higher number of victims, compared to a less populated but well-off neigh-
bourhood, reflects the optimal balance obtained through a market whose transac-
tions established and "validated" the geography of the flight paths? In such a case, 
the only conclusion would be that poor people set less store on life than others...
In any case, the money transfer from the producers of the nuisance1 to its victims 
eliminates neither the disturbance – whether conscious or not – caused by the 
noise, nor the risk in case of an accident. The sole result would be a price for the 
citizens' silence... 
Brussels Studies
the e-journal for academic research on Brussels  6
1 Or from their clients, by passing on the costs in plane fares.
Thierry Bréchet and Pierre Picard, “Can economic instruments regulate noise pollution in locations near airports?”,
comments of Frédéric Dobruszkes, Brussels Studies, issue 12, 2007 december the 3rd, www.brusselsstudies.be
Brussels Studies
the e-journal for academic research on Brussels  7
Thierry Bréchet and Pierre Picard, “Can economic instruments regulate noise pollution in locations near airports?”,
comments of Frédéric Dobruszkes, Brussels Studies, issue 12, 2007 december the 3rd, www.brusselsstudies.be
Furthermore, several questions can be raised as to how a market in rights to make 
noise would be applied. In the first place, the territory concerned by this market 
would have to be determined, and this inevitably involves a prior political decision. 
Unless the market's boundaries were circumscribed, nothing would prevent some-
one located 50 km from the airport who perceives the far-off noise of an airplane 
from claiming his due. Secondly, would the negotiation be left up to the citizens or to 
their political representatives? In the first case, what would happen if just one resi-
dent refused flights overhead while the neighbours accepted (or even called for) 
these flights in exchange for financial compensation? In the second case, the role of 
politicians obviously would be acknowledged, at the same time raising the question 
of method (role entirely entrusted to the elected officials, concertation with the citi-
zens, etc.). And going a bit further, should the citizens have a weighted voice (from 
the sheer point of view of noise, would a mother on maternity leave who is home 
most of the day count more than her husband working in another neighbourhood, 
or an elderly person who is hard of hearing)? How would the noise and risks borne 
at the work place or at school2 be factored in?
Lastly, the neutrality of a noise permit market solution seems illusory since it disre-
gards the social realities and social relations present in the territory of Brussels 3. The 
geography of airport nuisance arises from technical constraints as well as from a 
complex interplay of social and political relations in which social inequality enters 
fully, as seen in the geography of protests against noise pollution which we discuss 
in other documents. It was only a strong structuring of the higher-income neigh-
bourhoods and an institutional power ratio disadvantageous to the Brussels-Capital 
Region that made it possible to create or reactivate flight paths over the central, 
dense and lower-income neighbourhoods of Brussels. In this context, we feel that 
the issue of airport nuisance precisely should be regulated on the basis of political 
choices, and even more precisely on the basis of a simple, but a priori objective and 
easily objectivisable criteria: that of minimising the volume of the population exposed 
to noise and the risk of accident, regardless of its social and linguistic configuration4.
We also feel that the illusion of a market solution, instead of state regulations, is not 
adapted to the problem of airport nuisance. The absurdity of the idea emerges more 
clearly when we transpose it to other areas where environmental problems are at 
stake. Take for example the case of nuclear waste. It would be enough to establish 
a market involving the nuclear power stations operators along with all the countries 
of the world, or even their citizens directly (to avoid political intervention) in the aim 
to dispatch cumbersome wastes to the few countries that would be willing to ac-
cept them, in other words, the poor countries in sad need of currency. What is 
more, this exercise should not be difficult, given the differences in living standards 
and costs of living. Neither should this raise too many objections at the local level: 
illiteracy and lack of access to information in these countries is such that control of 
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the information would at best be asymmetrical. And moreover, in the case of con-
cerns about local conditions for nuclear waste management then rules for public 
safety would have to be imposed. One more distortion hampering a free and neutral 
market...
All this might well sound amusing, except that at the end of the day what is truly at 
stake is the future of state regulations. Their dismembering, an ongoing activity 
since the neo-liberal turnabout that occurred in the early 1980s, obviously musters 
scientific theories that justify this process and help make it possible. What is impor-
tant lies not so much in their truth as in the political use made of them. In this con-
text, a market for the right to make noise is a sign of the times. But is it truly reason-
able to replace State authority, a costly relic of centuries past, by a few computers 
to lead us to Market Equilibrium?
The author is grateful to Pierre Marissal and Gilles Van Hamme for their helpful re-
marks.
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Thierry Bréchet and Pierre Picard
Response to the comments made by Frédéric 
Dobruszkes
We thank Frédéric Dobruszkes for his interesting remarks.
First we should like to point out that our article intended to underline the fact that 
noise pollution is an externality involving local residents (of all social-demographic 
groups) and the airline operators. According to Coase, this externality can only be 
resolved by granting one party a right to produce this nuisance and allowing the 
possibility to compensate the other party. The alternative to such a definition of 
noise rights is a mechanism called "order and control" by which a regulator deemed 
to be "benevolent" assembles and processes all the information concerning the 
social cost of nuisances and their distribution, as well as their benefits for the opera-
tors and, if relevant, the workers. This top-down alternative does not seem credible 
in a federation where successive federal governments have not been able to negoti-
ate true measures (no compensation system has been implemented, for instance), 
where the regions are unable to reach an agreement on noise level standards to 
evaluate the nuisance, and lastly where the situation is determined by various juris-
dictional decisions. In contrast, the permits market represents a bottom-up solution 
as the framework for local residents representatives and airline company operations 
to seek an equilibrium between compensation and nuisance. This solution avoids 
potential conflicts of interest (of the Communities, for example) by giving the same 
right to each representative of individuals (ex: Dutch-speaking, French-speaking) 
living under the flight paths. In his comment, Frédéric Dobruszkes does not seem to 
demonstrate how a political solution would be more apt to work in concrete terms 
compared to the market solution.
Contrary to Frédéric Dobruszkes's comments, the equilibrium of a noise permits 
market is fully compatible with a distribution of flights over less densely populated 
zones. Indeed, for each flight the representative of a less populated zone would 
request a lower overall compensation for it must be distributed among a small num-
ber of residents. In other words, in order to have the same overall level of compen-
sation for his zone this representative would have to accept a greater number of 
flights. This inverse ratio between population density and number of flights is a fea-
ture not only of the socially efficient solution but of the permits market solution as 
well.
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III.
Furthermore, the permits market solution is perfectly compatible with a time seg-
menting of flights and permits. As Brechet and Picard have explained (CORE Dis-
cussion Paper, UCL, 2007), it is desirable to create one market for day flights 
(6:00-22:00) and a second for night flights (22:00-6:00). As the disturbance, for the 
same traffic volume, is greater at night than during the day, the price of noise per-
mits would be higher at night. Some airlines will find that it is not profitable to fly at 
night and will modify either their schedules or their activity structure. Here again, the 
market solution will be efficient and socially optimal. It does not call for any political 
involvement, as in the DHL case.
In his comment, Frédéric Dobruszkes evokes other arguments that are interesting 
but somewhat beside the point. For example, he highlights the problem of fairness 
between residents of different socio-demographic origins subjected to the noise. 
Like Mr Dobruszkes, we also feel that the various flight paths inevitably will pass 
over populations of different socio-demographic origins. And like Mr Dobruszkes, 
we fully acknowledge that the markets lack the capacity to promote fairness among 
individuals with different income levels. Nevertheless, it is not justified to claim that 
redistribution among socio-demographic classes must come about through spatial 
allocation of air routes. It is also unjustified to condemn solely the (potential) noise 
permits market for lack of fairness while all other markets equally lack this capacity. 
To be completely consistent Frédéric Dobruszkes would thus have to propose elimi-
nating other markets such as the stock market or real estate, consumer goods, etc. 
In the present context, the issue is to ensure the efficient allocation of flights over 
urban areas. Fairness generally comes about through redistribution of income and 
through taxation.
In his comment Frédéric Dobruszkes also highlights a public health problem; that 
citizens incorrectly evaluate the impact of noise pollution on health and that this 
inaptitude is more frequent among the poorest and least educated social classes. In 
our proposal, the actors in the permits market are local representatives of the resi-
dents, for example acting on behalf of residents associations or the municipalities 
located in the flight paths. Consequently, there is a certain degree of collectivity and 
democracy in which the debate on public health must be addressed. In actual fact, 
this issue is indeed present in the demands supported by the residents associations 
and elected officials of the various municipalities involved. 
Lastly, Frédéric Dobruszkes evokes the problem of a single resident being able to 
block air traffic by exercising a right of veto or by requesting too high a compensa-
tion. This eventuality does not appear in our proposal for several reasons. The first is 
due to the fact that the residents' compensation requests are collective and organ-
ised by zone. The position of one resident unconditionally opposed to aircraft noise 
would be mitigated by that of other residents more inclined to accept a certain level 
of disturbance and receive compensation. The second reason relates to the fact 
that several routes are open and that total blockage of air traffic implies the block-
age of each and every one. The third reason relates to the fact that the residents will 
always accept a first flight as long as the compensation is high enough. This hy-
pothesis is verified empirically in most hedonic price models1. The final reason illus-
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1  For example, the low level of air traffic at the Tempelhof Airport (Berlin) does not seem to 
perturb the residents who have called for it to continue its activity.
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trates the originality of our proposal which eliminates the problem of the "tragedy of 
the commons" among the zones located along a flight path. In our proposal, a zone 
has effectively no incentive to exaggerate the impact of noise pollution and claim an 
exaggerated compensation for it will not entirely benefit from the revenue of its ac-
tion.
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